Practice
Migration toward the boundary is a normal process, not a deviation
Workarounds are not indiscipline. Rasmussen described the pressures that move any working system toward the edge of what it can tolerate, and they operate whether or not anyone intends them to.
Rasmussen's 1997 model describes an operating point pushed by two gradients: management pressure toward efficiency, and individual pressure toward least effort. Both move the system toward the boundary of acceptable performance, and neither is a failure of anybody's intentions. Behaviour a product team records as misuse is the visible part of that migration, and it is the best available evidence about where the boundary now sits.
Every deployed product accumulates practices its designers did not specify. Data maintained in a spreadsheet beside the system because the fields do not fit the case. A credential shared because the permission model has no role matching the job somebody actually does. A record created with placeholder values because the form demands what is not yet known and the work cannot wait. A step skipped because it has never once produced a different outcome.
The comfortable reading is that these are violations, correctable by instruction and attributable to the people performing them. Rasmussen set out why that reading survives so poorly. A system operates within a space bounded by economic failure, by unacceptable workload and by functional acceptability, and it is subject to systematic pressures. Management presses toward efficiency, moving the operating point away from the economic boundary and toward the others. Individuals press toward least effort, moving it further. Neither pressure is pathological; both are the normal conduct of a working organisation, and together they produce a drift nobody authored. Accidents do not generally arise from a decision to behave unsafely. They arise when a system that has migrated steadily toward its boundary meets a variation it would once have absorbed.
Snook's study of the shootdown of two American helicopters over Iraq described the related mechanism he called practical drift: locally sensible adaptations, each rational within the unit that made it, accumulating into a global state nobody designed and nobody could see. The units had not disobeyed. They had adapted to the conditions they faced, and the adaptations were incompatible in a way that became apparent only on the day it mattered. Product systems drift the same way, with the same local rationality. Cook and Rasmussen added the property that makes it hard to catch: a system under sustained efficiency pressure runs with progressively less margin, and the loss is invisible while nothing goes wrong, because margin is what gets consumed first and margin is not measured.
Treating a workaround as misconduct discards information. The adaptation measures the distance between the task as specified and the task as performed, taken by the person best placed to take it and at their own expense. It shows where the design failed to accommodate a real case, how often that case arises, and what the people doing the work consider compliance to cost.
Reason's distinction locates the responsibility. A permission model that cannot express a role the organisation actually has is a latent condition. It causes nothing on the day it ships; it causes the shared credential eighteen months later, and the sharing is an active failure only in the sense that it is the part that happened last. The structural remedy is to make the margin observable — recording how often a step is bypassed, a record created incomplete, an action reversed — while the distance to the boundary still exists. Without that, the first report that the margin has gone is the incident that consumed it.
Sources
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: A modelling problem. Safety Science, 27(2–3), 183–213. Source of the operating-point model and the two gradients.
Snook, S. A. (2000). Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq. Princeton University Press. Source of practical drift.
Cook, R., and Rasmussen, J. (2005). "Going solid": A model of system dynamics and consequences for patient safety. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 14(2), 130–134.
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge University Press. Source of the active failure and latent condition distinction.
All sources are paraphrased; nothing above is quoted. The product examples are the author's illustrations of the cited mechanisms and are not drawn from the sources.